

THE NEW AGE

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NOTES OF THE WEEK.

Bankers and the Economic Conference.

The exposure of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan's private benefactions to American politicians comes at a particularly opportune time. It will facilitate our task in getting the public to accept the interpretation we have placed on international political history since the end of the war. Two of the beneficiaries named are General Dawes and Owen T. Young, each of whom, in turn, was held out by the British Government to be the impartial expert author of the Plan associated with his name, with the result that the House of Commons passed both plans without the slightest attempt to examine them. It is now evident that these plans were "Morgan" Plans, and, by reason of the intimate affiliations of the Bank of England with American finance, "Norman" plans also. Another beneficiary is Mr. Norman Davis, who has been held out by the Press to be President Roosevelt's roving diplomat, but who henceforth must be regarded as a "Morgan" Intelligence Officer. His private interview with Dr. Schacht just previously to Herr Hitler's official pronouncement of Germany's policy with regard to Disarmament takes on a significance which one hopes will not escape the attention of those who returned Hitler to power on a programme of contingent re-armament.

It will be remembered that the *Star* warned Hitler (see last week's issue of THE NEW AGE) that he couldn't "tweak the noses" of the Jews and "expect easy money" from the bankers. The significance of this warning lies not so much in the implicit assumption that to hurt a Jew is to hurt a banker (a gratuitous assumption, since there are as many Gentiles as Jews in the banking game) but in the implicit (and well-founded) assumption that if you offend a banker you suspend your credit. The *Financial Times's* warning to Lloyd George was an attestation of the fact that this is so, and a description of the way in which it is done. In view of the disclosures elicited by the Senators' inquiry it is

pretty evident that when Mr. Norman Davis privately met Dr. Schacht he imparted to that gentleman Mr. Pierpont Morgan's views on what the policy of the Nazi Government ought to be, and perhaps even the textual formulae in which it should be officially proclaimed in the Reichstag. It is more likely, however, that the composing of Hitler's speech was the work of Dr. Schacht and his associates in the Reichsbank. In any case it is now a matter of history that Hitler's speech was not an extempore declamation, but a careful recital from a written document. Following the prudential precedent set by the immortal Bottom, he abandoned his loud roaring of armed nationalism and resorted to the soft cooing of disarmed nationalism for fear of "frightening the ladies" and bringing upon himself the retribution of financial decapitation.

Whether he or his friends are aware of it, he was abandoning the fundamental principle of his policy. For, so long as the technical axioms and rules of the financial system remain in universal operation the only factor which makes nationalism anything more than just a name is armaments. Disarmament is de-nationalisation. Hitler, it is true, announced reservations: he would disarm, he said, if other nations would disarm in step with Germany. This would be a logical and equitable arrangement if the menace to any country's national integrity had its prime source in other countries, and if the only means whereby a country's national integrity could be destroyed were military in character. But both suppositions are chimerical. The danger overshadowing every country is not external, and it is not military; it is internal, and it is financial.

If you liken each country to a fortress, and its population to a garrison, the factor stimulating militarism in these days may be described as the impulse of each commander to lead out sorties against other fortresses in order to capture provisions. This impulse would be the same whether there was an actual shortage of provisions in the fortress; or whether the commander of the garrison *thought* there was. So if you imagine a person inside each fortress with the power and opportunity to secrete provisions you have an all-sufficing explanation of the sorties of the garrisons. And if you further imagine these traitorous persons to be in league with each other, you can see how they can keep all the garrisons in a state of perpetual warfare without revealing

the fact that they are doing so, and while even preaching sermons against the wickedness of violence! Far-fetched as this conception is within the terms of the illustration, it is a literal fact in actual contemporary international relationships. Every Governor of a Central Bank is a traitor inside the national fortress. They are all food-hiders. Montagu Norman hides British food from the British garrison; Schacht hides German food from the German garrison; Morgan (in association with the Federal Reserve Board) hides American food from the American garrison: and so on throughout the world.

There is one important difference between the situation pictured in the illustration and the situation as it exists. It is that in the illustration the garrisons would have no dealings with each other except as combatants—no truces and fraternisations—no exchanges of visits on a social basis; the consequence being that no garrison, faced with a shortage of provisions (or an imagined shortage) would have any ground for attributing it to thefts by other garrisons. Such a garrison would simply say: "Here, we haven't enough: we must get some more out of the other fellows." An appeal to necessity as justifying war. Quite otherwise is the situation today. Every national garrison, faced with a shortage of provisions, and reduced to trying to keep alive on emergency-rations, is convinced that other garrisons have stolen provisions from them—in the language of commerce, that "foreigners" have "captured their market." Thus it becomes not merely a matter of necessity, but a matter of justice, that they shall "recapture" their "lost" market—that they shall "recover their export trade." The belief is plausible enough, because overseas trading has assumed such large proportions in relation to domestic trading, and appears to offer such wide scope for some nations to "sell more than their fair share" in what is called the "world-market." There is, of course, no such thing as a "world-market." Britain's "world-market" is the home-market of Germany, of France, of America, etc.; Germany's "world-market" is the home-market of Britain, etc.; and so, in turn, with every other nation.

Reverting to our illustration, it will be seen that from the point of view of any one garrison its "world market," so to speak, would be the stores of provisions in the other fortresses—these stores, regarded collectively, would be an external pool out of which this garrison would seek to make up their shortage. But, bearing in mind the secret provision-hiding assumed to be going on in each fortress, there would be two "world markets," the one visible and the other invisible. The visible market, even if divided fairly, would not satisfy the necessities of the garrisons. And supposing that one garrison were able to overpower, sack and destroy all the other fortresses, the alleviation of their necessities would only be transitory, because the captured provisions would be secreted inside their own fortress without their knowing it. The time would come when renewed scarcity would drive them to march out once more, but there would be no visible enemy and no visible fruits of victory! Their only chance of survival would now depend on their having the wit, or the luck, to discover the deception being practised upon them by the traitor in their midst. If they made that discovery, then they would dig up the treasure and bury the traitor in the hole. The old prophets foretold the beating of swords into ploughshares, but in these times we do not need ploughshares, and in fact we draw swords because we have too many ploughshares, as was recognised by that American statesman who declared of his country's post-war accumulation of productive capital, plant and equipment, that it was "a millstone round our necks" unless America could get the rest of the world to absorb its output of products. No; if we do anything with our swords it must be to forge them into keys—keys giving us access to the stored-up wealth, now locked out of our sight. This presupposes that we can locate the store and design the key. Happily we can, because both problems have been solved; and what remains is the simpler task of verifying the solution as discovered and announced by

Major Douglas, and proclaimed by the Social Credit Movement in the four quarters of the world.

A Hair, they say, divides the False and True;

Yes; and a single Alif were the clue,

Could you but find it—to the Treasure-house,

And peradventure to *The Master* too.

There was never a time when the clue to this elusive division between falsity and truth was a matter of such moment as now, when, almost coincidentally, there has been a financial upheaval in the United States, a political upheaval in Germany, and the summoning of the World Economic Conference in London. The Conference, looked at realistically, is an assemblage of treasure-hunters. Each delegation represents a nation whose population is on short rations. Their purpose in meeting is to ascertain if there is any way in which (a) every population can get larger rations or (b) the existing quantity of rations can be more fairly distributed. What they are doing is exactly the same as if the fortress commanders in our illustration met together in some neutral spot in order to examine each other's inventory of stores in the hope of allaying the discontents of their garrisons by peaceful negotiation instead of fighting. For reasons given there would be a deadlock: each inventory, whatever its size relatively to others, could be shown to be insufficient for the needs of the garrison to whom it related. And that is what will happen in the World Economic Conference. Of what use is it to establish the fact (if it is a fact) that, let us say, England, or America, has a disproportionately large share of "world trade," when the representatives of either country could reply: "Yes, but our people are just as badly off as yours; and if we concede you anything they will be worse off?"

The fact itself that these national delegations have come away from their own countries to search each other shows that they do not know that they've left at home what they are searching for, and that their own native bankers are sitting on it. And there's worse to be said. The Conference has been convoked by the Central Bankers, and you have the ludicrous spectacle of treasure-hunters lured away from the treasure by the treasure-hiders, and shut up in a room to moralise and sentimentalise while their financial masters do business. One of the main items on the bankers' agenda is Disarmament; and it is easy to foresee that the delegates to the Conference will play into their hands on this subject. Only too readily will they turn aside from the prickly problems of reaching agreement on the sharing of world-trade, and rest their hope of restored prosperity on the cutting down of expenditure on armaments. We have already said that disarmament is de-nationalisation. Every nation in a disarmed world would be in the same position as any county in England. The Surrey County Council have no power to bargain with other counties on questions affecting trade and employment in Surrey. They cannot erect a tariff barrier round that county; and they certainly cannot do anything to affect the exchange value of "Surrey currency." The consequence is that the Surrey-born population have to take their chance whether they can attract enough trade at English price-levels to find employment and wages inside their own county. If not they must migrate into other counties where the conditions of competition are more favourable. That is to say, Surrey could be extinguished as a political and economic entity by reason of some development which, on bankers' logic, seemed to require it. There are, as a fact, towns in England which are virtually extinguished in this sense and from such cause. And so, in a disarmed world every country would likewise have to abide by the logic of its natural competitive efficiency or inefficiency. Someone may object that national disarmament does not necessitate the relinquishment of a nation's control of tariff policy. Nor does it; but in a disarmed world the issue of any tariff war would be decided by the bankers. This is another way of saying that a Government's tariff-policy would fail to secure its

object unless the bankers approved that object. And if they *did* approve the object, the Government would not need a tariff; the bankers would secure it for the Government by methods of their own. The question of what sort of object the bankers would disapprove can be answered definitely. Bankers are opposed in principle to all "artificial" obstacles to the "interchange of wealth" between nations. The reason why they object in principle is because every such obstacle is raised by nations to prevent the entry into their market of goods which are made at a less cost and sold at a less price than the home manufacturers of the same goods can make and sell them for. The bankers' principle is that goods should flow uninterruptedly from the country where their cost is lowest to all other countries, just in the same way as in the case of England where, supposing Yorkshire produced an article at less cost than any other county, the Yorkshire article would capture the whole market of England provided that Yorkshire could make a sufficient quantity to supply the market. The principle is sound in itself because in theory it enables the public to buy more for their money. But that is not the reason why the bankers approve it. They desire to cheapen the cost of living in order to reduce rates of wages and salaries. The English wage-regulation device—the Cost-of-Living Index—almost formally fixes the quantity-rate of consumption for the working population at the level of the year 1913.

And so throughout the world. The cheapest producers, whether firms or countries, are used by the bankers as instruments for driving competitors out of business or compelling them to reduce their distribution of wages, salaries and dividends. Their object is twofold. In the first place they lessen the collective quantity of credit required for a given volume of production. In the second place they prevent the community from accumulating a sufficient saving of money to finance a policy of their own choosing. Thus they conserve the use of the nation's credit and control the actions of the nation's elected Government.

The Ecclesiastical Commissioners.

"The Ecclesiastical Commission for the Management of Church Property, as now existing, was incorporated in 1836, its constitution being amended in 1840-1 and 1868. The main function of the Commission (whose members are given below) is the management of the estates of the Church in order to endow or augment benefices, etc.

"Summary of Receipts and Expenditure, 1929
(Extracted from Annual Report presented to Parliament).

Forward	£
Estates	254,000
Dividends and Interest	1,550,000
	1,346,000
	£3,150,000
Benefices, Archbishops, Bishops, Administration, etc.	2,261,000
Appropriation for future Augmentations, etc.	462,000
Min. Depreciation Fund	89,000
Towards replacement of value of Securities transferred to Church of England Pensions Board	50,000
Balance forward	297,000
	£3,150,000

"Ecclesiastical Commissioners.—The two Archbishops, the forty Bishops, The Deans of Canterbury, St. Paul's, and Westminster; The Lord Chancellor; The Lord President of the Council; The Lord Chief Justice; The Lord Chancellor of the Exchequer; one of H.M. Principal Secretaries of State; The Lord Chief Justice; The Master of the Rolls; Earl Beauchamp, K.G., P.C., K.C.M.G.; Viscount Halifax; Lord Daryngton, P.C.; Rt. Hon. Hy. Hobhouse, P.C.; Rt. Hon. Laurence Hardy, P.C.; Sir W. A. Mount, Bt., C.B.E.; Sir Lewis T. Dibdin, D.C.L.; George Middleton, M.P.; A. T. Loyd."

Extracted from *Whitaker's Almanack*, 1931.

Wage-Cuts Under Social Credit.

A correspondent asks us why it is provided in part of Major Douglas's Scheme for Scotland that wage rates in all organised industries shall be reduced by 25 per cent. where the reduction does not involve a loss to the wage-earner exceeding 20 per cent. of the sums received in the form of a National Dividend.

Under the operation of this provision and assuming the National Dividend to be at the rate of £100 per annum per head, no deduction from anyone's wages would exceed £20 per annum. Upon the inauguration of the Scheme everybody's income (from both sources) would rise by at least £80 per annum. The full 25 per cent. reduction would only fall on wages amounting to four-fifths, and less, of the Dividend. Thus a man earning £80 per annum would drop £20 in wages and get £100 in Dividend. Or a youth earning £48 per annum would drop £12 in wages and get £100 in Dividend. The man's total income would rise from £80 to £160 and the youth's from £48 to £136. And a lower wage still, say, £24 per annum would become a total income of £118. Thus, the lower the worker's receipts as wages the higher his proportionate receipts as Dividend. The £80 is doubled: the £48 is multiplied by nearly 3; and the £24 is multiplied by nearly 5. Per contra, the aristocrat of Labour, such as, for example, the newspaper compositor with his £400 a year, would drop £20 and pick up £100, getting a total income of £480 or about 1½ times his wages.

The question now is: Why do it this way? Why not leave wages untouched, and pay out the Dividend (whatever the amount you propose to distribute) as an addition thereto? Why knock £20 off the £80 wages and give £100 in Dividend, when you could let the £80 stand and give £80 in Dividend? Why make a man, as it were, buy a £100 Dividend for £20 when you can give him an £80 Dividend for nothing?

Well, the full and authentic answer can only be supplied by Major Douglas himself. We must simply describe what we ourselves consider to be the merits of the policy.

In the first place we can take it for granted that no student of the Douglas Analysis will question the fact that the policy is technically efficient as a means of reaching the objective aimed at—which is, to put it briefly, to clear the market of consumable production; to make sure that all the people collectively get possession of all the goods collectively. This purpose is fulfilled by the collective use made of the collective Dividend, and not by the amounts in which it is allocated to this or that person or section of the community. The root principle is that the financial necessity for industry to sell shall be met by the financial ability of the community to buy. The question of whether this financial ability is "equitably" spread through the community or "inequitably" concentrated in the hands of privileged persons, is irrelevant to the technical problem of clearing the goods out of industry. Questions of "equity" are questions of politics, and are referable to moral considerations, whereas the question of technique is non-political and non-moral. To put the truth in its most extreme form, if one single Scot collared the whole of the Scottish National Dividend and cleared the market with it, the primary technical principle of Social Credit would be fulfilled. Every believer in Social Credit would hotly resist such a thing, but would have to base his resistance on some other ground than that production and consumption were not equated—for, ex hypothesi, they would have been. This hypothesis is only tenable in theory. In practice it is impossible for modern industry to sell all its products unless it serves a very large number of customers. No small number of rich customers could buy articles for personal consumption at a fraction of the rate at which industry could make them for sale. The logical attitude of the Social Credit technician, as such, towards the question of "equity" in distribution is not that the few rich

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The Social Credit Movement.

Supporters of the Social Credit Movement contend that under present conditions the purchasing power in the hands of the community is chronically insufficient to buy the whole product of industry. This is because the money required to finance capital production, and created by the banks for that purpose, is regarded as borrowed from them, and, therefore, in order that it may be repaid, is charged into the price of consumers' goods. It is a vital fallacy to treat new money thus created by the banks as a repayable loan, without crediting the community, on the strength of whose resources the money was created, with the value of the resulting new capital resources. This has given rise to a defective system of national loan accountancy, resulting in the reduction of the community to a condition of perpetual scarcity, and bringing them face to face with the alternatives of widespread unemployment of men and machines, as at present, or of international complications arising from the struggle for foreign markets.

The Douglas Social Credit Proposals would remedy this defect by increasing the purchasing power in the hands of the community to an amount sufficient to provide effective demand for the whole product of industry. This, of course, cannot be done by the orthodox method of creating new money, prevalent during the war, which necessarily gives rise to the "vicious spiral" of increased currency, higher prices, higher wages, higher costs, still higher prices, and so on. The essentials of the scheme are the simultaneous creation of new money and the regulation of the price of consumers' goods at their real cost of production (as distinct from their apparent financial cost under the present system). The technique for effecting this is fully described in Major Douglas's books.

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